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Appellant Sony Electronics Inc. ("Sony") respectfully submits this reply brief in 
response to the brief of the Appellees, Erland and Sharlene Reber (the "Rebers"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed Sony's breach 
of contract claim against the Rebers under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As explained in Appellant's opening brief, Sony brought suit against the 
Rebers under a written Guaranty Agreement (the "Guaranty"), pursuant to which the 
Rebers agreed to guarantee payment of the debts of Visual Technology, Inc. ("Visual 
Technology"). The Rebers claim that they cannot be held liable under the Guaranty 
because they previously sold the assets of Visual Technology to a new entity that 
subsequently changed its name to "Visual Technology, Inc.," the exact same name of the 
entity identified in the Guaranty1, and because the debt in question was incurred by the 
new entity. The Rebers, however, never revoked their Guaranty or informed Sony of the 
asset sale. In essence, the Rebers claim that they cannot be held liable under the 
Guaranty because Visual Technology, as operated by its new owner, Bruce Jackson, is a 
different corporate entity than the Visual Technology operated by the Rebers. Although 
these defenses involve factual questions, the trial court dismissed Sony's complaint as a 
matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6), without affording Sony as opportunity to investigate 
the Rebers' factual arguments through discovery, and without allowing Sony to amend its 
complaint if new claims came to light as a result of that discovery. 
1
 The Rebers obviously were complicit in this deception because the new entity 
could not have changed its name without the consent of the former entity which was 
controlled by the Rebers. See. U.C.A. §§ 16-10a-401(2)(a) and -401(3)(a) & (b)(i)(A). 
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The dismissal was in error for two separate reasons. First, the trial court erred by 
making findings of fact that contradicted the pleadings in order to reach the conclusion 
that Visual Technology was a different corporate debtor from the entity owned by the 
Rebers. In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court is required to 
assume that the facts plead in Sony's complaint are true, and it must consider those facts 
in the light most favorable to Sony. Instead of granting Sony the deference mandated by 
Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court entered a factual conclusion that contradicted the pleadings. 
At a minimum, Sony should have been allowed to conduct discovery in order to rebut the 
Rebers' factual contentions. 
Second, even if the Rebers' untested assertions regarding the asset sale were true, 
the Rebers' remained liable for Visual Technology's debt because they failed to revoke 
their written Guaranty. Controlling Utah law provides that a guaranty remains in effect 
until it is revoked in writing by the guarantor. In addition, both the language of the 
Guaranty and Utah law recognize that a guaranty remains enforceable despite any 
subsequent changes in the debtor's name, location, or corporate structure. Accordingly, 
the trial court's ruling that the Rebers could not be held liable was error as a matter of 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred by Entering Findings of Fact that Contradict the 
Well-Plead Allegations of the Complaint. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Sony's complaint against the Rebers because 
the complaint adequately pleads a claim for breach of contact. In deciding a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court is required to "assume that the factual 
allegations in the complaint are true, and [to] draw all reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff." Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, If 13, 65 P.3d 1184, 1187 
(Utah 2003) (quoting Valley Colour. Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc.. 944 P.2d 361, 362 
(Utah 1997)). Thus, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the trial 
court is merely reviewing "the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief." Id. at ^ 15. 
In this case, the Rebers cannot reasonably dispute that Sony's complaint was 
"formally sufficient." To state a cause of action for breach of contract under Utah law, 
Sony must allege four elements: (i) the existence of a contract; (ii) performance by the 
plaintiff; (iii) non-performance by the defendant; and (iv) damages. Mackey v. Cannon, 
2000 UT App 36, Tf 13, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084. Sony's complaint meets these elements. 
The complaint alleges that the Guaranty is a valid and binding contract, that Sony 
shipped goods for which it was not paid, and that it was damaged as a result of the 
Rebers' failure to honor the Guaranty. (R. 4-5) Although the Rebers' may ultimately 
assert their "new entity" defenses at trial or during later stages of the proceeding, it was 
not proper to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(6)(b) because it sufficiently plead a 
cause of action. 
Rather than accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, the trial court drew 
its own factual conclusions from the pleadings and submissions outside the Complaint. 
Specifically, the trial court concluded that Visual Technology, as operated by Bruce 
Jackson, was an entirely different corporate entity than the Visual Technology owned by 
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the Rebers.2 (R. 290). The trial court based this finding on the fact that Visual 
Technology had changed its address from the location listed in the Guaranty, and that the 
company had changed its corporate signatory over time. (Id.) The trial court erred in 
making these findings for at least three reasons. 
First, the trial court is not permitted to enter findings contrary to the allegations of 
the complaint in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. As noted above, Rule 12(b)(6) requires the 
trial court to assume that the facts alleged are true, and to construe any inferences in favor 
of the plaintiff. Here, the trial court construed the facts against Sony. As discussed at 
length in Sony's opening brief, there are a number of legitimate reasons why a 
corporation may change its address (i.e., moving to a better location or negotiating a 
better lease), or for that matter, use more than one address on correspondence (i.e., 
multiple locations, etc.). The use of secondary address would affect its ownership or 
structure. By the same token, corporations routinely change signatories or authorize 
more than one signatory to conduct their affairs. In fact, companies routinely authorize 
even lower level employees to sign for the shipment of inventory. None of the facts that 
the trial court relied on - when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff -
suggest that the company has become an entirely different corporate entity as a matter of 
law. Taken to its logical conclusion, the trial court's ruling suggests that any time a 
debtor changes its address or authorizes another person to sign for inventory, all of its 
2
 Given an opportunity to conduct discovery, Sony may have been able to establish 
that the so-called "new entity" was, in fact, an alter ego of the former entity, or that, for 
other reasons, the Rebers should be held liable for the debts of the new entity because of 
their personal involvement in, or personal gain from, the deceptive use of the same name 
without providing any notice of the change to the creditors of the former entity. 
credit agreements and other contracts become void as a matter of law. This is not, and 
cannot be, the law for obvious reasons. 
Second, the Guaranty specifically provides that the Rebers would remain obligated 
to pay Visual Technology's debts, even z/the company subsequently changed its address 
or personnel. Section 3 of the Guaranty states: 
Character of the Obligation. This Guaranty is an absolute, continuing, 
unconditional and unlimited Guaranty. ... This Guaranty shall be effective 
regardless of any subsequent incorporation, reorganization, merger or 
consolidation of the Debtor, change in partners, change of name or any 
other change in the composition, nature, personnel or location of the Debtor 
whatsoever. 
(R. 13-14). Thus, in negotiating their agreement, the parties specifically anticipated that 
Visual Technology may one day wish to change its management or location, and 
specifically provided that the Rebers would remain liable under the Guaranty 
notwithstanding any such changes. 
Third, if the trial court considered Visual Technology's change in address and 
signatory dispositive, it should have allowed Sony to conduct discovery in order to 
explore the circumstances surrounding these events. Discovery may have demonstrated 
that the Rebers intentionally concealed their sale of Visual Technology's assets from its 
creditors, or that they continued to participate in the company's affairs following the sale 
to Mr. Jackson. These facts could have allowed Sony to pursue its claims under an alter 
3
 On pages 23-24 of their brief, the Rebers argue that the address of Visual Technology 
was an "identifying characteristic" of the debtor, such that the Guaranty should only be 
construed to apply to goods sold to Visual Technology at 2155 S. Main. Paragraph 3 of 
the Guaranty expressly contradicts this argument, and demonstrates that the parties knew 
and understood that Visual Technology may one day change its location. 
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ego or successor liability theory.4 However, because the trial court refused to allow 
discovery, Sony had no opportunity to rebut the Rebers' allegations. Under these 
circumstances, dismissal was inappropriate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (providing that 
parties are to be given a "reasonable opportunity" to present rebuttal materials). 
In response to these arguments, the Rebers contend that the trial court properly 
entered findings of fact under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
dismissing Sony's complaint. See Rebers' Br. at 19. This argument misses the point. As 
a threshold matter, Rule 52(a) applies to matters "tried upon the fact without a jury or 
with an advisory jury" and to matters in which the trial court is required to "judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Because this issue never 
advanced to discovery or trial, there was no opportunity for the trial court to hear and 
evaluate the factual evidence. In essence, the Rebers asked the trial court to try the merits 
of the entire case and enter fact findings, without ever hearing witnesses or reviewing all 
relevant documentary evidence. This is not an appropriate basis for invoking Rule 52(a). 
In any event, Rebers' argument is irrelevant. The Rebers admit that even if Rule 
52(a) were construed to allow the trial court to enter of findings of fact, the findings must 
be "in line with the allegations of the complaint." Rebers' Br. at 19-20. Here, however, 
the trial court erroneously substituted its own findings regarding the corporate structure 
of Visual Technology for those plead in the complaint. Because the trial court failed to 
4
 The Guaranty provide that it "shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
successors and assigns of the parties." (R. 15, | 10). 
accept Sony's allegations as true, or at a minimum, allow discovery on the Rebers' 
factual claims, its decision was erroneous. 
II. The Rebers Remain Liable on the Guaranty Because they Failed to Revoke 
Their Obligations in Writing. 
The trial court's dismissal should also be reversed because the trial court 
misinterpreted Utah law regarding the enforceability of the Guaranty. Under Utah law, a 
guaranty remains effective until it is revoked in writing by the guarantor.5 See, e.g., 
Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1982); Cessna Finance 
Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978); Mule-Hide Products Co. v. White, 
2002 UT App 1, | 15 40 P.3d 1155, 1159. Moreover, unless properly revoked, a 
guaranty will continue to be effective despite any subsequent changes in the corporate 
debtor's ownership, structure, or management. See, e.g. Zions First National Bank v. 
Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977), Mule-Hide Products, Inc. v. White, 40 P.3d 1155 
(Utah Ct. App. 2002).6 
5
 Though not directly raised in this appeal, at the trial court level, there was an issue as to 
whether New Jersey law should have governed the Guaranty. To the extent New Jersey 
law applies, it follows the general position accepted by the Utah courts that a guaranty 
remains effective until revoked in writing. See e.g., Summit Trust Company v. Willow 
Business Park, 269 N.J. Super. 439,444-45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994)(guarantor liable for 
failing to obtain a release from the creditor); First New Jersey Bank v. F.L.M. Business 
Machines, Inc., 325 A.2d 843, 849-50 (N.J. Super. 1974) (guarantor liable for future 
advances made prior to revocation); Swift & Co. v. Smigel, 279 A.2d 895, 899 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 1971)(enforcing guaranty against incompetent where guarantor's estate failed 
to revoke agreement). 
6
 Case law from other jurisdictions also supports this principle. See, e.g., Loving & 
Associates v. Carothers, 619 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (merger did not release 
guarantor from contractual obligation); Sun Bank / Treasure Coast v. Goldman, 580 
So.2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (guarantors liable on corporate debt following merger and 
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In this case, it is undisputed that the Rebers never revoked their Guaranty, and 
never provided Sony with notice that they no longer intended to be held liable for the 
debts of Visual Technology. Instead, the Rebers (perhaps even intentionally)7 allowed 
Sony to continue selling goods on credit in reliance on the Guaranty. The Rebers' Sale 
Agreement with Mr. Jackson indicates that the Rebers sold their business as a going 
concern, and that they had an affirmative obligation to operate the business in its 
customary fashion prior to Mr. Jackson's taking possession. Among other things, the 
Rebers were required to maintain regular business hours, pricing, and inventory, and to 
refrain from conducting "liquidation" or "close-out sales." (R. 68). These provisions 
were undoubtedly intended to protect Visual Technology's goodwill by providing 
continuity to its customers. Without affirmative notice, creditors like Sony had no reason 
to suspect that the company was changing ownership. 
More importantly, public policy requires that the Rebers remain liable on the 
Guaranty. The Rebers were the only party with knowledge of the asset sale - they had 
the ability to avoid liability by simply informing Sony of the sale and their intent to 
revoke. However, they chose to do nothing. Had Sony been informed of the change in 
subsequent asset transfer); Farmer v. Peoples American Bank, 209 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1974) (stockholder liable on guaranty following change in corporate ownership). 
As indicated in Sony's opening memorandum, the Rebers had an incentive to conceal 
the change in ownership from Visual Technology's creditors, as they were paid for the 
asset sale over time by promissory note. By preserving Visual Technology's ongoing 
business relationships with its creditors, the Rebers could increase the likelihood of the 
business succeeding, and in turn, the likelihood of their note being paid. Because Sony 
was denied its request for discovery, it was not permitted to fully explore the 
circumstances surrounding the Rebers' failure to revoke. 
ownership, it could have requested a new guaranty from Visual Technology's new 
officers, or even terminated the credit relationship altogether. By remaining silent, the 
Rebers deprived Sony of the opportunity to protect itself in the event of default. Because 
the Rebers chose to conceal these facts from Sony, they remained liable on the Guaranty. 
See, e.g., Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, 504 P.2d 807, 809 (Idaho 1972).8 
In their opposition, the Rebers make three arguments in an attempt to extinguish 
their liability under the Guaranty. First, they argue that the Mule-Hide Products v. White, 
which Sony relies on, is distinguishable. (Rebers' Br. at 30). Second, the Rebers argue 
that the Guaranty must be narrowly construed against Sony under Lester Piano Company 
v. Romney, 126 P.325, 41 Utah 436 (Utah 1912). (Id. at 22-28). Finally, the Rebers 
argue that Sony failed to give adequate notice of "the revocation issue" in its complaint. 
(Rebers' Br. at 29). Each of these arguments lacks merit. 
A. Mule-Hide Products is Controlling and Establishes that the Guaranty 
is Enforceable. 
In their opposition, the Rebers ignore the wide body of case law recognizing that a 
guaranty remains in effect unless it is revoked in writing. Instead, the Rebers focus their 
efforts on distinguishing their conduct from Mule-Hide Products v. White, a case which 
In addition, it is important to note that just because the Rebers are held liable to Sony 
under the Guaranty, it does not necessarily follow that they will be out the value of debt 
without any recourse. The Rebers would have a cross-claim against Visual Technology 
(or a third-party complaint against Mr. Jackson) for breach of their Sales Agreement 
obligations. This is simply a matter of allocating the burden of collecting this unpaid 
obligations among sophisticated parties. 
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is on all-fours with this action.9 As discussed at length in Sony's opening brief, Mule-
Hide Products involved a situation where the guarantor, White, sold the assets of the 
corporate debtor to another business. See 40 P.3d at 1157. White failed to inform her 
creditors of the sale, and failed to revoke her guaranty. Id. The trial court concluded, and 
this Court agreed, that White remained liable on her guaranty even though she had sold 
the assets of the company. Id. at 1159. 
The Rebers contend that the present case is distinguishable from Mule-Hide 
Products because "Sony's products were ordered from, delivered and accepted at a 
different address from that defined in the Guaranty." Rebers5 Br. at 31. The Rebers' 
argument is irrelevant. As noted above, Section 3 of the Guaranty distinctly provides that 
the Guaranty would remain enforceable even //Visual Technology subsequently changed 
its location. Thus, there is no basis for contending that the shipment of goods to a 
different address would relieve the Rebers' from their contractual obligations. 
Moreover, this Court's holding in Mule-Hide Products does not simply "boil[] 
down to who had really purchased the goods..." as the Rebers contend. See Rebers' Br. 
at 30. Rather, this Court's focus in Mule-Hide Products was on the guarantor's failure to 
revoke her guaranty: 
Further, regardless of any knowledge or presumed knowledge by either 
White [the guarantor] or Mule-Hide [the creditor], a guarantor is held liable 
for the guaranteed debts which were incurred notwithstanding any 
substantial change in the financial structure and organization. In Mountain 
States Tel & Tel, the court stressed that the guarantor, to have escaped 
liability, should have properly withdrawn from his guaranty obligation. 
9
 The facts of Mule-Hide Products are discussed at length in Sony's opening brief at page 
17. 
Thus, even if the trial court erred in finding White knew her husband used 
her purchase order to order materials from Mule-Hide, the error was 
harmless because her knowledge is not determinative where she did nothing 
to revoke the agreement or guaranty. 
Mule-Hide Products, 2002 UT App. 1 ^ j 16-17. Consistent with the principles outlined 
in Mule-Hide Products, this Court should conclude that the Rebers remained liable on 
their Guaranty because it was never revoked in writing. 
B. Lester Piano is Distinguishable on Multiple Grounds. 
Unable to refute this Court's holding in Mule-Hide, the Rebers contend that this 
Court should construe the Rebers5 Guaranty narrowly under a dated Utah case, Lester 
Piano Company v. Romney, 126 P.2 325, 41 Utah 436 (Utah 1912). Lester Piano, 
however, is distinguishable on multiple grounds. To begin with, in Lester Piano, the 
Court held that there was no enforceable guaranty between the parties because the 
creditor had rejected the defendant's proposed form of guaranty. Id. at 328. Therefore, 
unlike the present case, there was no contractual guaranty in effect at the time of the 
debtor's default. 
Further, Lester Piano is also distinguishable in that the Court found that the 
creditor had been given notice of the change in ownership. Id. at 326. Specifically, the 
Court noted that an officer of the company had notified the plaintiff creditor of the 
changes in company's stock ownership and articles of incorporation. Id. at 326-327. In 
this case, the Rebers never took any measures to notify Sony of the asset sale. 
Finally, unlike the present case, the debtor in Lester Piano changed its legal name 
from Daynes & Romney Piano Company to Daynes-Romney Music Company following 
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the change in corporate ownership. Id. at 327. Here, however, Sony was dealing with 
an entity with the exact same legal name as the corporation with which it had originally 
contracted. Under these circumstances, there was no reason for Sony to suspect that the 
Rebers had sold the assets of Visual Technology, and no reason for Sony to question the 
ongoing validity of the Guaranty. 
C. Sony Was Not Required to Give Notice of the Rebers' Failure to 
Revoke Their Guaranty in the Complaint. 
As a final argument, the Rebers contend that they cannot be held liable under their 
Guaranty because Sony failed to give adequate notice of the "revocation issue" in the 
complaint. See Rebers' Br. at 29. In particular, the Rebers5 claim that Sony's complaint 
is somehow flawed because the "first time the issue or any factual allegations pertaining 
to revocation arose was in Sony's opposing memorandum to the Rebers' Motion to 
Dismiss." Id. The Rebers'argument is logically flawed. 
As noted numerous times above, Sony was never given notice of the Rebers' asset 
sale and was never notified of the Rebers' intent to revoke their Guaranty. To the 
contrary, Sony relied on the continued validity of the Guaranty in selling goods to Visual 
Technology on credit. Under these circumstances, Sony could not have plead the Rebers' 
failure to revoke as part of its complaint, as did not learn of the Rebers' refusal to honor 
the Guaranty until after litigation ensued. 
Moreover, there is no requirement that Sony plead the Rebers' failure to revoke as 
part of its complaint for breach of contract. To the extent revocation is at issue, it is an 
affirmative defense that must be raised by the Rebers. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (listing 
release among affirmative defenses to be plead by defendant). The Rebers alone carry 
the burden of raising the issue and proving the validity of their defense at trial. 
III. The Rebers Request for Fees on Appeal Should Be Denied. 
The Rebers' request for their fees in defending this appeal should also be denied. 
Although Sony does not dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 recognizes a 
reciprocal right to recover fees under a contract clause, that provision is limited to cases 
where the party is seeking to enforce the agreement. In contrast, when a party (such as 
the Rebers) seeks to avoid their obligations under the contract, Utah courts have refused 
to recognize such a reciprocal right. See e.g. BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 
(Utah 1978); Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT App. 341, | | 
10-12. The basis for this rule is clear - if the Rebers are not subject to the obligations of 
the contract, they cannot be afforded the benefits of the contract, including the rights 
afforded by an attorney's fees clause. BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 
1978) (a defendant "may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim the benefit of 
this provision for attorney fees"). 
Furthermore, even if this Court were to find that fees were recoverable, it does not 
mean that an award must be granted. Section 78-27-56.5 is "discretionary" - not 
mandatory. The statute provides that the Court "may" award costs and attorney's fees, 
not that it "shall" award such costs and fees. In this case, equitable principles mandate 
that the Rebers' request for attorney's fees be denied. 
Among other obligations, the Guaranty provided that the Rebers would serve any 
notices to Sony by certified or registered mail. See (R. 15 at f 15). The Guaranty also 
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provides that the Rebers' obligations survive any subsequent change in "incorporation, 
reorganization, ... or any other change in the composition, nature, personnel, or location 
of the Debtor" and is binding upon the parties' successors or assigns. See (R. 14-15, at 
Yi 3, 10.) Like any other corporation which extends credit to a local business, Sony 
relied on the notice and survival provisions of the Guaranty when it entered into the 
agreement, and Sony expected that the Rebers would abide by these provisions during 
their business relationship. See id. at Tf 2. 
When or if the Rebers ceased operating their business they did not revoke the 
Guaranty, and they failed to serve Sony with certified notice of the substantial change in 
their operations. Although abiding by these obligations would have prevented this 
lawsuit, the Rebers chose to ignore these obligations under the Guaranty. Instead, they 
sold the corporation and its assets without informing their creditors, including Sony, of 
this change, and without providing Sony, and their other creditors, with an opportunity to 
either discontinue providing credit to the new entity without a reaffirmation of the 
Guaranty or establish new financial arrangements with the new owners. For the Court to 
excuse the Rebers from compliance with their contractual obligations under the Guaranty, 
while, at the same time, allowing them to assert rights against Sony under the same 
document, would be contrary to § 78-27-56 and public policy. Therefore, under the 
circumstances of this case, and even if the Court concludes that the statute is applicable, 
the Court should exercise its discretion to deny any award to the Rebers because of their 
failure to comply with the notice provisions of the same document. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in dismissing Sony's Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The 
trial court failed to accept Sony's well-plead allegations as true, and, instead, improperly 
relied upon its own unsupported findings of fact. To the extent these facts, if true, would 
have been outcome determinative, the trial court erred in denying Sony the opportunity to 
conduct discovery on the factual claims. Further, even if the Rebers' assertions of fact 
are true, the trial court misapplied Utah law. Under Mule-Hide Products and related 
cases, the Rebers' Guaranty remained in effect until revoked in writing, notwithstanding 
any changes in the debtor's name, location, or corporate structure. 
Sony requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, and that the case be 
remanded to the lower court with instructions to enter a judgment finding that the Rebers' 
Guaranty is enforceable as a matter of law. In addition, Rebers should be required to 
answer the Complaint. Thereafter, Sony should be permitted to conduct discovery 
regarding the circumstances surrounding any defenses that are asserted by the Rebers', 
and, if appropriate, seek amendment of its complaint to assert additional causes of action. 
DATED this 30th day of July, 2004. 
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